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THE DAMAGE AWARD IN A MARITIME PERSONAL
INJURY CASE
Joseph D. Jamail*
We all know that damages are what a plaintiff seeks as pecuniary
compensation for a tortious act. This paper will attempt to deliniate
the elements of those damages in maritime personal injury and wrongful
death cases, their calculation, and the interest payable on an award.
This pursuit will require forays into the total lack of uniformity that
pervades maritime personal injury litigation.
PERSONAL INJURY
General Maritime Law/Jones Act
Admiralty jurisdiction includes tort actions for personal injuries to
seamen, passengers, and probably to all others while aboard a vessel
on navigable waters (the jurisdiction in personal injury cases is partly
statutory).' Prior to the enactment of the Jones Act in 19202 a seaman
had no remedy against a shipowner (beyond maintenance and cure and
wages during the continuing voyage) for injuries caused by the negligence
of the ship's officers or crew. However, a right to indemnity existed,
resulting from a shipowner's failure to maintain the vessel in a seaworthy
condition. 3
The Jones Act is restricted to "seamen" in all present day mani-
festations, 4 which include a hairdresser on a luxury liner.' All others
who are victims of a maritime tort may sue in admiralty or outside
admiralty under the savings to suitors clause. 6 The liability basis for
passengers is negligence. 7
In Panama R. Co. v. Johnson,' the Supreme Court concluded that
by enacting the Jones Act Congress meant to leave the prestatutory
Copyright 1985, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Member, Texas Bar.
1. G. Gilmore & C. Black, The Law of Admiralty § 1-10 (2d ed. 1975).
2. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1975).
3: IB Benedict on Admiralty § 2 (7th ed. 1983); The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 23 S.
Ct. 483 (1903).
4. See 1 M. Norris, The Law of Seamen §§ 9-27 (3d ed. 1970 & Supp. 1983).
5. Mahramas v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 475 F.2d 165 (2d Cir.
1973).
6. G. Gilmore & C. Black, supra note 1, § 6-21, at 328.
7. Id. § 1-10, at 22.
8. 264 U.S. 375, 44 S. Ct. 391 (1924).
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unseaworthiness remedy intact and merely add a remedy not previously
available for injuries resulting from negligence. In effect, the Jones Act
simply incorporated into maritime law the provisions of the Federal
Employees Liability Act (FELA).9 Today, a Jones Act count and an
unseaworthiness count, "Siamese Twins," are usually pled in the same
case, 10 although each is a separate cause of action." A third count, also
a separate cause of action, the ancient remedy of seamen known as
maintenance and cure, may also be asserted.' 2
Damages Recoverable
"General maritime law incorporates the general law of torts when
not inconsistant with the law of admiralty."' 3
Judge Rubin, while on the trial bench, charged the jury that the
following elements of damages were recoverable in a maritime personal
injury case:'4
"(1) Physical pain and suffering, including physical disability,
impairment, and inconvenience and the effect of plaintiff's in-
juries upon the normal pursuits and pleasures of life;
(2) Mental anguish and anxiety including humiliation, shame
and embarrassment, worry and concern, and feelings of economic
insecurity caused by disability;
(3) Income lost in the past;
(4) Impairment of earning capacity or ability in the future,
including impairment of normal progress in the plaintiff's earning
capacity."
Medical expenses incurred in the past and to be incurred in the
future, together with other economic loss are also recoverable' 5 (i.e.,
the reasonable value or expense of hospitalization, medical and nursing
9. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1972).
10. G. Gilmore & C. Black, supra note 1, § 6-38, at 383; Form 15, Official Forms
to Fed. R. Civ. P.; Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil Cases, U.S. Fifth Circuit District
Judges Association 57 (1983).
11. Baltimore S.S. Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316, 47 S. Ct. 600 (1927).
12. 2 M. Norris, supra note 4, § 557.
13. Harrison v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, S.A., 577 F.2d 968, 977 (5th Cir.
1978).
14. IB Bededict on Admiralty, supra note 3, § 32, at 3-276. See Pattern Jury
Instructions, supra note 10, Instructions 2A & 2B ; Downie v. United States Lines Co.,
359 F.2d 344, 347 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 897 (1966).
15. Downing, 359 F.2d at 347; Saleeby v. Kingsway Tankers, Inc., 531 F. Supp.
879, 883 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
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care and treatment necessarily or reasonably obtained by the plaintiff
in the past or soon to be obtained in the future). 6
The collateral source rule is applied to an award for personal injuries.
Thus the award is not reduced by payments from sources totally in-
dependent of the wrongdoer, such as pensions and social security ben-
efits.' 7
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Norfolk & Western Railway
Co. v. Liepelt,'8 the courts usually award lost earnings, past and future,
net of taxes.19
Maintenance and Cure
In addition to damages for unseaworthiness and negligence, a seaman0
is entitled to recover for maintenance and cure, and this separate cause
of action may be joined with a Jones Act cause of action and one for
unseaworthiness. 2' The remedy goes back to medieval sea codes but
appears to have been first recognized in this country in 1823 by Justice
Strong in Harden v. Gordon.22 The doctrine is based partly on much
quoted humanitarian grounds to protect seamen, who were said to usually
be "poor and friendless" and apt to acquire habits of overindulgence,
carelessness and improvidence. Today, the "poor seaman" has, for the
most part, entrusted his rights as an employee to union collective bar-
gaining.
The obligation of the shipowner to provide maintenance and cure
for seamen who become ill or who are injured during their period of
service is an implied contractual obligation imposed by the general
maritime law as one annexed to the employment.23 "Cure" is care,
including nursing and medical attention, beyond as fair a time after the
voyage as may be reasonably expected from such care and attention.2 4
"Maintenance" is the cost expended or the liability incurred by the ill
or injured seaman for his board and lodging on shore, comparable to
that to which he is entitled shipboard .2
16. Pattern Jury Instructions, supra note 10, at 136.
17. A.H. Bull S.S. Co. v. Ligon, 285 F.2d 936, 937 (5th Cir. 1960).
18. 444 U.S. 490, 100 S. Ct. 755 (1980).
19. See infra text accompanying notes 147-162.
20. Actually, all persons who are members of the ship's company (not passengers)
are entitled to maintenance and cure when ill or injured in the vessel's service and without
culpable misconduct on their part. 2 M. Norris, supra note 4, § 553, at 34.
21. Id. § 557, at 48.
22. 11 F. Cas. 480 (C.C.D. Me. 1823) (No. 6,047).
23. 2 M. Norris, supra note 4, § 547, at 25.
24. Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525, 528, 530, 58 S. Ct. 651, 653, 654
(1938).
25. Id. at 528, 58 S. Ct. at 653.
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"Maintenance and cure" was originally provided at minimum ex-
pense by the federal government's Marine Hospital Service and was later
furnished free of charge by U.S. Public Health Service Hospitals. 26
Recovery by suit was limited to expenses not available from those
services2 7 This inquiry is no longer problematical since the 1981 amend-
ment to the statute authorizing seamen to recover free medical treatment
at United States government hospitals has been repealed.2 Nevertheless,
the maritime law still imposes on the shipowner the obligation of main-
tenance and cure.
Where the seaman is a member of a union (as most are), and a
collective bargaining agreement is in force, the courts have generally
adhered to the compensation for maintenance and cure provided for in
the union contract. 29 On the other hand, one court has held that a
union and shipowners have no right to enforce a collective bargaining
agreement that provides r seaman with payments that are inadequate
to meet his maintenance needs.3 0
Remedy of Spouse of Seaman Who Suffered Non-Fatal Injuries
In Sea-land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet,3' the Supreme Court held that
under the non-statutory maritime death action shaped in Moragne v.
States Marine Lines, Inc.,32 the widow of a longshoreman who died as
a result of injuries received aboard a vessel in state territorial waters
could recover damages for the loss of her husband's "society." In
American Export Lines, Inc. v. Alvez, 33 the Supreme Court extended
this remedy to non-fatal injuries by permitting a spouse to recover
damages for loss of "society" in the case of a harbor worker injured
aboard a vessel in state territorial waters.
The Fifth Circuit, in Cruz v. Hendy International Co. ,4 held that
the general maritime law of unseaworthiness includes the right of the
spouse of a living seaman to recover for loss of "society" when the
injury occurs in state territorial waters. The spouse may join in the
injured seaman's suit or assert her claim in a separate suit. In dicta
the court suggested that this right to recover for loss of society due to
26. 2 M. Norris, supra note 4, §§ 590, 591, at 130.
27. Id. §§ 595, 596, at 134.
28. Id. § 590, at 66 (Supp. 1983).
29. Grove v. Dixie Carriers, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 777, 782 (E.D. La. 1982); Hodges
v. Keystone Shipping Co., 578 F. Supp. 620 (S.D. Tex. 1983).
30. Rutherford v. Sea-Land Serv., 575 F. Supp. 1365, 1373 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
31. 414 U.S. 573, 94 S. Ct. 806 (1974).
32. 398 U.S. 375, 90 S. Ct. 1772 (1970).
33. 446 U.S. 274, 100 S. Ct. 1673 (1980).
34. 638 F.2d 719, 725 (5th Cir. 1981).
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personal injury would also be available when the injury took place on
the high seas."
The recovery of the spouse exists under the maritime law of un-
seaworthiness,3 6 but is not available under the Jones Act and does not
embrace the "loss of consortium" as that term is understood at common
law. Recovery is limited to the pecuniary "loss of society" defined in
Gaudet and Alvez:" "[tihe term 'society' embraces a broad range of
mutual benefits each family member receives from the others' continued
existence, including love, affection, care, attention, companionship, com-
fort, and protection." 3
No recovery is allowed for emotional response to wrongful death,
mental anguish, grief, bereavement, anxiety, distress, or mental pain and
suffering. Furthermore, because it is recovered in the injured spouse's
suit, no award is made to the spouse for home nursing services or
services that would have been provided to the marital partnership.
A child has no right of action for loss of parental consortium
resulting from personal injury to the parent under the Jones Act or
apparently under any other law. 39
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
The application of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA)40
to maritime torts is extremely narrow in that it is restricted to artificial
islands and structures erected on the shelf which are more than three
miles from the coast of this country." Admiralty principles are eschewed;
personal injuries suffered on those artificial islands are governed by the
laws of the adjacent state that are not inconsistent with federal law.4 2
One writer has suggested that because of the adoption of state law,
a fixed platform worker's substantive rights against third parties are
governed by state law, irrespective of the platform's location on the
offshore waters of the United States. 43 The Supreme Court in Rodrigue
35. Id. at 725.
36. Bacon v. Bunting, 534 F. Supp. 412, 416 (D. Md. 1982), suggests that a loss of
society claim will lie whenever the injured spouse has a maritime claim either under an
unseaworthy or negligence theory.
37. Cruz, 63 F.2d at 726.
38. Gaudet, 414 U.S. at 585, 94 S. Ct. at 815.
39. Madore v. Ingram Tank Ships, Inc., 732 F.2d 475, 479 (5th Cir. 1984); Annot.,
11 A.L.R. 4th 549 (1982).
40. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356 (1983).
41. Texas and Florida are exceptions to the three mile rule, as the territorial w ters
of these states extend 10.4 miles from the coast. United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S.
1, 84, 129, 80 S. Ct. 961, 1007, 1030 (1960).
42. 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2)(A) (1983); Annot., 30 A.L.R. Fed. 535, §§ 5a, 6 (1976).
43. Schill, Available Forums and Recoverable Danages in Offshore Personal Injury
Litigation in the Fifth Circuit: A Review and an Analysis, 16 Hous. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1978).
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v. Aetna Casualty Co. 4 and Chevron Oil Company v. Huson41 clearly
implied that the law of the adjoining state, which is adopted as federal
law, provided all facets of the remedies provided by state law.
The snag in OCSLA cases is that the state law not be "inconsistent"
with federal law. That problem arose in Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil
Oil Corp.46 The Supreme Court, after holding that state and federal
courts had concurrent jurisdiction in OCSLA cases, remanded the case
to the Fourteenth Texas Court of Civil Appeals in Houston to determine
whether the federal common law rule enunciated in Liepelt, requiring
that FELA juries be instructed as to the non-taxability of personal injury
awards, applied to an OCSLA personal injury action based on the law
of Louisiana, the state adjacent to the fixed platform on which the
injury occurred.
The Texas court47 held that OCSLA made the state law cause of
action for personal injuries applicable federal law, therefore the issue
of whether or not a non-taxability instruction should be given was
governed by the law of Louisiana. The Supreme Court denied an ap-
plication for certiorari. The Fifth Circuit has since concluded that the
Texas. court reached the result required by Rodrigue and Huson.48
The distinction between workers on floating and fixed platforms on
the shelf is incongruous if not absurd, but the distinction remains a
feature of offshore personal injury jurisprudence. 49 The fixed platform
worker is limited to a claim against his employer for compensation under
the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers Compensation Act (LHWCA)
when the injury occurs on the outer continental shelf and outside the
territorial waters of the adjoining state; if the injury occurs within a
state's territorial waters, he must look to that state's compensation
benefits for recovery.50 A non-seaman platform worker's exclusive remedy
is LHWCA. 51
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act
Since the late nineteenth century, as a result of a series of Supreme
Court decisions, longshoremen and harbor workers have been entitled
44. 395 U.S. 352, 84 S. Ct. 1835 (1969).
45. 404 U.S. 97, 92 S. Ct. 349 (1971).
46. 453 U.S. 473, 101 S. Ct. 2870 (1981).
47. Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 628 S.W.2d 171 (Tex. Civ. App. 1982),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 259 (1982).
48. Olsen v. Shell Oil Co., 708 F.2d 976, 983 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 715 (1984).
49. Robertson, Injuries to Marine Petroleum Workers: A Plea for Radical Simpli-
fication, 55 Tex. L. Rev. 973, 992 (1977).
50. Schill, supra note 43, at 7-8.
51. Musial v. A & A Boats, Inc., 696 F.2d 1149, 1154 (5th Cir. 1983).
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to bring suits in admiralty against shipowners for damages caused by
their negligence. 2 Employees in maritime employment, including long-
shoremen or other persons engaged in longshoring operations, may now
recover damages for personal injuries by statutory action against the
vessel for negligence under the LHWCA.-3
Section 5 of the Act, as amended in 1972, recognizes a federal cause
of action for negligence in third party actions by longshoremen against
shipowners. But Congress' desire for a uniform federal negligence remedy
for such workers has not been entirely successful in practice, mainly
because of the failure of Congress to specify the precise standard of
care owed by shipowners to longshoremen. 4 The lower courts wrestled
with various formulae until finally the Supreme Court set forth its own
views in Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos." However,
the Court failed to completely address the range of potential problems,
and the lower courts are again bearing the burden of achieving the
desired national uniformity.
Damages recoverable by a longshoreman or a harbor worker in a
third party action under the Act are compensatory and awarded in
accordance with the loss the plaintiff has suffered as a result of the
defendant's negligence-nature and extent of the injuries, wages lost,
medical expenses, and pain and suffering.56 An injured harbor worker's
spouse can recover for loss of society. 7
Suits Against the Government
The United States has enacted two waiver statutes that permit it to
be sued for maritime torts: the Suits in Admiralty Act of 192058 and
the Public Vessels Act of 1925. 59 With the 1960 amendment to the Suits
in Admiralty Act, it seems clear that the coverage of that Act includes
all maritime tort claims against the United States where the plaintiff
would have an action in admiralty were the defendant a private person
rather than the government. 60 Actually, the judicial trend has long been
to read the two Acts together in order to channel maritime claims
52. IA Benedict on Admiralty, supra note 3, § 91.
53. 33 U.S.C. §§ 902(3), 905(b) (1982).
54. IA Benedict on Admiralty, supra note 3, § 91.
55. 451 U.S. 156, 101 S. Ct. 1615 (1981).
56. Roselli v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 524 F. Supp. 2, 4 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Doca v.
Marina Mercante Nicaraguense, S.A., 474 F. Supp. 751, 758 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
57. Doca, 474 F. Supp. at 758.
58. 46 U.S.C. § 742 (1983).
59. Id. § 781.
60. McCormick v. United States, 680 F.2d 345, 349 (5th Cir. 1982).
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against the government to the admiralty side of the district courts.6'
Both acts authorize suits for personal injuries.62
Punitive Damages 3
In 1981, the Fifth Circuit held in a wrongful death case that punitive
damages are recoverable under general maritime law upon a showing
of willful and wanton misconduct by the shipowner. 64 It thus followed
previous case law in both wrongful death and personal injury cases.65
The courts, under the general maritime law, have allowed the award
of punitive damages in cases of willful and wrongful denial of a seaman's
maintenance and cure. 66 They have denied punitive damages in a case
of retaliatory discharge of a seaman . 6
The question of whether the Jones Act alone would authorize the
award of punitive damages has not been decided by the Supreme Court,
and there is a conflict of authority in the lower courts on this point. 68
The Fifth Circuit in In re Merry Shipping69 left open the question of
whether punitive damages may be recovered under the Jones Act.
Retaliatory Discharge
Retaliatory discharge is a relatively new maritime tort, first recog-
nized in an opinion by Judge Rubin in the case of an at will seaman
fired in retaliation for his having filed a Jones Act personal injury claim
against his employer. 70 The principal reason for the court's decision was
inequity, predicated mainly on the traditional protective attitude of the
admiralty courts toward seamen. The claim may be joined with the
seaman's personal injury action under the Jones Act and unseaworthiness
and may be tried by a jury.
The employer's retaliatory discharge is classified as an intentional
tort entitling the seaman to recover compensatory damages (including
the expenses of finding new employment), lost earnings while seeking
61. G. Gilmore & C. Black, supra note 1, § 11-11.
62. American Stevedores v. Portello, 330 U.S. 446, 452, 67 S. Ct. 847, 850-51 (1947).
63. See generally Faris, Symposium: Maritime Personal Injury-New Vistas of Dam-
ages in Maritime Personal Injuries, 43 La. L. Rev. 913, 925-31. (1983).
64. In re Merry Shipping, 650 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1981).
65. Id. at 624 n.9.
66. Robinson v. Pocahontas, Inc., 477 F.2d 1048 (1st Cir. 1973); Hodges v. Keystone
Shipping Co., 578 F. Supp. 620 (S.D. Tex. 1983); Harper v. Zapata Offshore Co., 563
F. Supp. 576 (E.D. La. 1983).
67.' Smith v. Atlas OffShore Boat Serv., Inc., 653 F.2d 1057 (5th Cir. 1981); Annot.,
62 A.L.R. Fed. 790 (1983).
68. Annot., 10 A.L.R. Fed. 524, 536 (1983).
69. 650 F.2d at 627.
70. Smith, 653 F.2d at 1063.
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employment, lost future earnings if the new job pays less than the old,
and mental anguish.
7
'
In Roberie v. Gulf Oil Corp.,7 2 the court held that a roustabout
on a fixed offshore platform was a "maritime worker;" he therefore
had a retaliatory discharge claim, a maritime tort.
WRONGFUL DEATH
Background
Admiralty jurisdiction encompasses tort actions for the wrongful
death of seamen, passengers, and others who perish on navigable waters.
In 1920, Congress passed two separate statutes creating maritime
wrongful death remedies: the Jones Act" and the Death on the High
Seas Act (DOHSA).7 4 One commentator, often cited, has said that
"DOHSA and the Jones Act, enacted almost simultaneously, were hope-
lessly inconsistent with each other, both as to the nature of the wrongful
death recovery and as to the classes of beneficiaries entitled to recover." 5
In 1886, in The Harrisburg,76 the Supreme Court had held that there
was no cause of action under the general maritime law for wrongful
death. In part, DOHSA provided a remedy, but this remedy was only
applicable to death "caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default occurring
on the high seas beyond a marine league from the shore of any state.
' 77
In 1970, the Supreme Court in Moragne v. States Marine Lines,
Inc. ,7s overruled The Harrisburg and judicially created a federal general
maritime law cause of action for wrongful death occurring on navigable
waters within the territorial limits of a state. The Moragne remedy,
applicable in territorial waters, precludes recognition in admiralty of
state wrongful death statutes.
79
When a death occurs on the high seas, DOHSA is the exclusive
wrongful death claim for actions brought in admiralty based on unsea-
worthiness,80 with the possible exception of claims that may be joined
under state survival statutes. 81
71. Id. at 1064.
72. 545 F. Supp. 298 (W.D. La. 1982).
73. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1983).
74. Id. § 761.
75. G. Gilmore & C. Black, supra note 1, § 6-29.
76. 119 U.S. 199, 7 S. Ct. 140 (1886).
77. 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1983).
78. 398 U.S. 375, 90 S. Ct. 1772 (1970).
79. Nelson v. United States, 639 F.2d 469, 473 (9th Cir. 1980); In re S.S. Helena,
529 F.2d 744, 753 (5th Cir. 1976).
80. Bodden v. American Offshore, Inc., 681 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1982).
81. Solomon v. Warren, 540 F.2d 777 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed sub nom
Warren v. Serody, 434 U.S. 801, 98 S. Ct. 28 (1977); Dennis v. Central Gulf Steamship
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The Jones Act provides "a remedy for negligence anywhere on the
water."8 s2 The Jones Act also incorporates a survival statute, § 9 of
FELA (the Federal Employers Liability Act),8 3 and allows a cause of
action for the conscious pain and suffering that the deceased endured
prior to death. 4 A Jones Act personal injury claim is distinct and
separate from a DOHSA wrongful death claim. Thus, a seaman injured
on the high seas may settle his personal injury claim against the vessel,
die, and his widow may then sue under DOHSA for his wrongful death
based on a claim of unseaworthiness of the vessel.8 5
The seaman's estate may also have a survival claim under applicable
state survival statutes.8 6 This could be significant in raising damages
because under some state survival statutes a decedent's estate may recover
more than the limited pecuniary losses of the survivors under their
wrongful death claims.8 7 For example, in Kuntz v. Windjammer "Bare-
foot" Cruises, Ltd.,8" the decedent was a 20-year-old single woman
whose wrongful death beneficiaries could only recover pecuniary damages
of $2,840.14 under DOHSA, but under the Pennsylvania survival statute
the administrator of her estate recovered $118,369.00. DOHSA does not
preempt the use of state survival statutes to supplement the remedies
for passengers and other non-seafarers killed on the high seas, therefore,
claims under DOHSA and state survival actions may be joined in one
action. 9
Wrongful death claims may also be brought against the United States
under the Suits in Admiralty Act9° and the Public Vessels Act.9' Where
applicable, these statutes constitute the exclusive remedy for wrongful
Corp., 453 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972); Dugas v. Nat'l Aircraft Corp., 438 F.2d 1386 (3d
Cir. 1971). Note that these cases precede the United States Supreme Court's holding in
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 98 S. Ct. 2010 (1978), which includes
the word "survival" in its enumeration of the issues exclusively covered by DOHSA. See
also Smith, A Maritime Survival Remedy: Is There Life After Higginbotham?, 6 Maritime
Law. 185 (1981); Kuntz v. Windjammer "Barefoot" Cruises, Ltd., 573 F. Supp. 1277
(W.D. Pa. 1983), where the court held that survival actions under state law or the general
maritime law were not preempted by DOHSA, and the Dugas line of cases was not
overruled by Higginbotham.
82. Bodden, 681 F.2d at 333.
83. 45 U.S.C. § 59 (1983).
84. Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 85 S. Ct. 308 (1964); Deal
v. A.P. Bell Fish Co., 728 F.2d 717 (5th Cir. 1984).
85. 681 F.2d at 331-33.
86. Gillespie v. United States Steel, 379 U.S. at 157, 85 S. Ct. at 313.
87. Id.
88. 573 F. Supp. 1277 (W.D. Pa. 1983).
89. Id. at 1286.
90. 46 U.S.C. § 742 (1983).
91. Id. § 742.
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death claims arising from all maritime torts against the United States. 92
Third party claims by survivors of workers covered by the LHWCA
include wrongful death actions. 93 Since the 1972 amendments to this
act, such suits are based solely on "negligence.' ' 94
Section 905(b) states that "the remedy provided in this subsection
shall be exclusive of all other remedies against the vessel except remedies
available under this chapter." It has been suggested that this "negligence
remedy" should be conceptualized as "statutory" in origin and character
and therefore not as derived from the general maritime law. 95
Finally, suits for wrongful death may be maintained by survivors
of fixed platform workers covered by the terms of OCSLA under the
law of the adjacent state as surrogate federal law. 96
Elements of Damages for Wrongful Deaths on Navigable Waters:
Damages Recoverable
Lost financial contributions the decedent would have made to the
beneficiaries
The beneficiaries of a deceased seaman have a Jones Act claim to
recover the "reasonable likelihood of [financial] contributions" that they
would have received from the decedent. 97 Under the Moragne general
maritime wrongful death scheme, this element of damages is recoverable
as a part of the loss of support sustained by the decedent's dependents.
"Support includes all the financial contributions that the decedent would
have made to his dependents had he lived." 98
This element of damages is likewise recoverable under DOHSA, and
the measure of recovery is the actual pecuniary benefits that the de-
cedent's beneficiaries could reasonably have expected to receive from
the continued life of the decedent. 99
State survival actions may also provide recovery for losses to the
estate of the decedent, including the loss of future earnings of the
decedent. 100
92. McCormick, 680 F.2d at 349; Kelly v. United States, 531 F.2d 1144 (2d Cir.
1976).
93. 33 U.S.C. § 933 (1983).
94. G. Gilmore & C. Black, supra note 1, § 6-33, at 371 (1975).
95. Id. § 6-62, at 471.
96. Rodrigue, 395 U.S. 352, 84 S. Ct. 1835 (1969).
97. Davis v. Parkhill-Goodloe Co., 302 F.2d 489, 494 (5th Cir. 1962).
98. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 94 S. Ct. 806 (1974).
99. Solomon, 540 F.2d at 786.
100. Id. at 790.
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Conscious pain and suffering endured by the decedent
This element of damage, although not pecuniary, may be recovered
under the survival provisions of the Jones Act. l0' Eyewitness evidence
of a deceased's conscious pain and suffering before his death is not
necessary to support an award of such damages. 10 2 This evidentiary
burden becomes important in the case of drowning deaths where, quite
often, there are no witnesses to the events preceding death. In such
cases, there must be evidence to support a reasonable inference of
consciousness. 03
Such evidence has been effectively supplied through expert medical
testimony of a forensic pathologist as to the cause of death and probable
length of consciousness, coupled with a psychiatrist/neurologist's de-
scription of the severe emotional strain and anguish that a drowning
person experiences before death."04
DOHSA does not provide recovery for the conscious pain and
suffering of the decedent. 05 However, the Act does not preclude a
personal representative from alleging such a cause of action in pendent
claims under applicable state survival statutes. 0 6 The general maritime
law allows the personal representative of an estate to seek damages for
the deceased's pain and suffering prior to death. 0 7 Damages for conscious
pain and suffering are also allowed in death actions brought under the
Public Vessels Act and Suits in Admiralty Act. 08
Loss of society
"Society" was defined by the Supreme Court in Sea-Land Services,
Inc. v. Gaudet as including "love, affection, care, attention, compan-
ionship, comfort, and protection."'' 0 9 Judge Rubin added the elements
of "solace" and "sexual relations.""10 Under the general maritime law,
101. Gillespie, 379 U.S. at 157, 85 S. Ct. at 313; Deal, 728 F.2d at 718.
102. Deal, 728 F.2d at 718; Cook v. Ross Island Sand & Gravel Co., 626 F.2d 746,
748 (9th Cir. 1980).
103. Deal, 626 F.2d at 750.
104. Cook v. Ross Island, 626 F.2d at 752.
105. Solomon, 540 F.2d at 792; Law v. Sea Drilling Corp., 510 F.2d 242, 248 (5th
Cir. 1975).
106. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. at 625, 98 S. Ct. at 2015; Solomon, 540 F.2d at 792-
93.
107. Supra note 69; Barbe v. Drummond, 507 F.2d 794 (1st Cir. 1974); Spiller v.
Thomas M. Lowe, Jr., & Assocs., Inc., 466 F.2d 903 (8th Cir. 1972); Dennis v. Central
Gulf S.S. Corp., 453 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972).
108. Curry v. United States, 338 F. Supp. 1219 (N.D. Cal. 1971); Abbott v. United
States, 207 F. Supp. 468 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
109. Gaudet, 414 U.S. at 585, 94 S. Ct. at 815.
110. Cruz, 638 F.2d at 722.
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loss of society is recoverable for wrongful death occuring inside territorial
waters."' Loss of society is not authorized under either DOHSA"2I or
the Jones Act." 3
A child's loss of nurture, guidance, training, and education
Under a general maritime law (Moragne) cause of action for wrongful
death, the loss of nurture and guidance to children is an element of
damage." 4 This element of damage is treated as a pecuniary loss under
DOHSA and is recoverable."' Likewise, it is a proper element of damages
under the Jones Act." 6
Loss of services
The loss of services the decedent would have rendered to his be-
neficiaries is an element of damages that is recoverable under the Jones
Act," '7 DOHSA," 8 and the general maritime law." 9
Grief
Grief, bereavement, or mental anguish of the survivors is not com-
pensable under either the Jones Act,' 20 DOHSA,' 2' or general maritime
law. '
22
Loss of inheritance
Under the general maritime law cause of action for wrongful death,
if a survivor can establish his own reasonable expectation of an inher-
itance of money from the decedent, this becomes a recoverable element
111. Gaudet, 414 U.S. at 585, 94 S. Ct. at 814.
112. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 98 S. Ct. 2010 (1978).
113. Beltia v. Sidney Torres Marine Transport, Inc., 701 F.2d 491 (5th Cir. 1983);
Ivy v. Security Barge Lines, Inc., 606 F.2d 524 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
956 (1980); Christofferson v. Halliburton Co., 534 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir. 1976).
114. Annot., 18 A.L.R. Fed. 184 § 11 (1974).
115. Id.; Solomon, 540 F.2d at 788; Annot., 16 A.L.R. Fed 696 § 9 (1973).
116. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v. Richardson, 295 F.2d 583, 593 n.9(a) (2d Cir.
1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 989 (1962).
117. Ivy, 606 F.2d at 525.
118. Solomon, 540 F.2d at 786.
119. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 94 S. Ct. 806 (1974).
120. Cook v. Ross Island, 626 F.2d at 748; Thompson v. Offshore Co., 440 F. Supp.
752, 765 (S.D. Tex. 1977).
121. Id.
122. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 94 S. Ct. 806 (1974); In re S.S. Helena, 529 F.2d 744
(5th Cir. 1976).
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of damages.'23 The same rule of recoverability of an expected inheritance
applies to suits under DOHSA.12 4
Medical expenses of the decedent
It is clear that a seaman's claim for maintenance and cure, being
contractual, survives to his estate, and may be recovered under the
general rule that claims sounding in contract survive the death either
of the obligor or obligee.12s
Funeral expenses
Under general maritime law, this element of damage is recoverable,
at least where the decedent's dependents have either paid for the funeral
or are liable for its payment.' 26 The Supreme Court in Mobil Oil Corp.
v. Higginbotham, noted that funeral expenses may be treated as pe-
cuniary losses recoverable under DOHSA or under the general maritime
law. 127
Under the Jones Act, the funeral expenses are recoverable if, and
only if, the widow, under state law is legally obligated to pay them. 2
Punitive damages
A scholarly analysis of the Fifth Circuit case of In re Merry Shipping,
Inc., ' 29 concluded that punitive damages may not be recoverable in
wrongful death actions arising on the high seas or in actions based
solely on the Jones Act. However, punitive damages should be recover-
able in wrongful death actions based upon both the Jones Act and the
general maritime law for unseaworthiness. Punitive damages may be
recoverable in wrongful death actions arising in state waters and based
upon the general maritime law. 30
CALCULATION OF DAMAGES
The reduction to present value of future pecuniary losses arising
123. Complaint of Cambria S.S. Co., 505 F.2d 517, 522-523 (6th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied sub nom, Gordon v. Dahl, 420 U.S. 975 (1975); Thompson v. Offshore Co., 440
F. Supp. at 762.
124. Solomon, 540 F.2d at 787.
125. Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 430 n.4, 78 S. Ct. 394, 397
n.4 (1958); Sperbeck v. A.L. Burbank & Co., 190 F.2d 449, 450 (2d Cir. 1951).
126. Gaudet, 414 U.S. at 591, 94 S. Ct. at 818.
127. 436 U.S. at 624 n.20, 98 S. Ct. at 2014 n.20.
128. Cities Service Oil Co. v. Launey, 403 F.2d 537 (5th Cir. 1968); Moore v. The
O/S Fram, 226 F. Supp. 816 (S.D. Tex. 1963), aff'd sub nom. Wilhelm Seafoods, Inc.
v. Moore, 328 F.2d 868 (5th Cir. 1964).
129. 650 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1981).
130. Faris, supra note 63, at 925.
[Vol. 45
MARITIME PERSONAL INJURY
from a tort which are paid in a lump sum is now settled law.' 3' But
just how this is done in personal injury cases remains abstruse.
In 1916 in Cheasapeake & 0. Ry. v. Gainey,3 2 the Supreme Court
said that the present worth concept was commonly recognized, citing
seventeen state and two federal court decisions. But the Court sidestepped
laying down "a precise rule or formula" and avoided approving "any
of the particular formulae that have been followed in applying the
principle; since in this aspect the decisions are not harmonious, and
some of them may be subject to question."
The formulae are rendered no less elusive in the latest pronouncement
of the Supreme Court on the subject in its 1983 decision in Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Pfeifer. 33 That case involved the reduction to
present value of a personal injury award to a longshoreman under Section
905(b) of the LHWCA. 3 4 The Court actually decided only (1) that it
was error to make mandatory the formula used by a state court in the
state where the accident occurred and (2) that there are several economic
methods of discounting, but because Congress in the Act had provided
for an award of damages without guidance as to how they were to be
calculated, the Court limited itself to suits under Section 905(b).' 3" The
Court did no more than was necessary to resolve the specific case before
it, while noting that "[tihe average accident trial should not be converted
into a graduate seminar for economic forcasting."'16
In Culver v. Slater Boat Company 3 7 (Culver 1) the Fifth Circuit
overruled an old anachronism previously stated in Johnson v. Penrod
Drilling Co.,' which held that neither proof, nor argument, nor jury
instruction concerning inflationary factors ° could be considered or used
in maritime, Jones Act, and FELA personal injury and wrongful death
actions. The Penrod court bottomed this holding mostly on the fact
that in 1975 the government proposed to do something about inflation!
The antecedents of this case are extensive.
An original November 21, 1972 panel opinion which contained an
extensive discussion of the inflation issue was on petition for rehearing
abbreviated to the sparse language found in the first Johnson v. Penrod
Drilling Co. reported case. 3 9 A Pandora's box had been opened by
letting an economist loose in the district courtroom and allowing him
131. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 913A (1977).
132. 241 U.S. 494, 36 S. Ct. 633 (1916).
133. 103 S. Ct. 2541 (1983).
134. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1983).
135. Pfeifer, 103 S. Ct. at 2555.
136. Id. at 2555, 2556.
137. 688 F.2d 280 (5th Cir. 1982) (reh'g en banc).
138. 510 F.2d 234 (5th Cir.) (reh'g en banc), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 839 (1975).
139. 469 F.2d 897, 904-05 (5th Cir. 1973) (as amended on denial of reh'g and reh'g
en banc).
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to project the plaintiff's future earnings. 40 As will be shown, this
conglomeration of discounting to present value is really economics and
not a legal question.
While the Fifth Circuit was pondering an application for rehearing
in Culver I, the Supreme Court decided Pfeifer. The Fifth Circuit, with
nine judges dissenting, then donned academic robes and reconsidered
Culver I in light of Pfeifer by withdrawing Culver I except as it overruled
Johnson and proceeded to substitute Culver II.14 1 Thirteen judges held
that absent a stipulation, fact finders shall determine and apply an
appropriate "below market discount rate as the sole method to adjust
loss of future earnings awards to present value to account for the effects
of inflation." Expert testimony and jury instructions must be based on
this method, but jurors may be instructed either to return a general
damage verdict or to answer special interrogatories concerning their
computation of damages.
This economic exercise undoubtedly required much soul searching
for Judges Rubin and Frank R. Johnson, Jr., who wrote for the ma-
jority. They recognized that no formulae were likely to produce the
result that would have been obtained had the plaintiff not been injured,
that no one can predict the course of future inflation, and that a survey
of the general economic literature for the past several years illustrates
"a sorry tale of repeated confusion, contradiction and uncertainty in
economic forcasts" since 1850 the science of economics has been "dis-
mal" and is still "conjectural." 1 42 Yet this economic chaos is now
transmuted into law.
One only has to read the opinion in Pfeifer to realize that the Court
was seeking the solution of an economic problem. The opinion bristles
with citations to economic texts and authors.
One distinguished economist, Professor Arthur C. Mead, frankly
says that economists use "a jargon that is unknown to others" and
that "to provide estimates favorable to a particular individual is con-
strained almost solely by conscience."'' 43 This proposal is hard to explain
to a jury, but a jury might find even more difficult his explanation of
one aspect of the problem as:
PV = W(I + i)(1 + q)
(1 + r)
Nevertheless, the bar is faced with the problem, although a petition for
writ of certiorari is pending in Culver I. (This author's opinion on
140. Johnson, 510 F.2d at 237-38.
141. Culver v. Slater Boat Co., 722 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1983) (petition for reh'g en
banc).
142. Id. at 119, 120.
143. Arthur C. Mead, Calculating Present Value, 20 Trial 16 (July 1984).
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how Culver II mandates reduction to present value is attached as an
annex to this paper.) In the first analysis, the proof of loss of future
earnings lies with an economist,' 44 the use of whom creates an additional
expense to litigants.
Although Culver II speaks only of "loss of future earnings awards,"
other elements of personal injury damages have been the subject of
discounting. Damage awards covering future medical expenses have been
discounted,' 4 but there is conflict concerning the discounting of an
award for pain and suffering.146
INCOME TAX
Damages received for personal injuries are not subject to federal
income tax. 47 The Internal Revenue Service has stated the same about
wrongful death awards. 48 Since World War II the courts had been
virtually unanimous in the general view that a personal injury award
should not be reduced because it is exempt from income tax. 49
In 1980, the Supreme Court, in Norfolk & Western Railway Co.
v. LiepeltA50 a FELA wrongful death case, held that:
(1) Evidence showing the effect of income taxes on the de-
cedent's estimated earnings was admissible; and
(2) The jury should have been instructed that "Your award
will not be subject to any income taxes, and you should not
consider such taxes in fixing the amount of your award."
The Liepelt rule is now applied to lost future earnings for one who is
injured but not killed in a maritime accident.' 5'
In Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp.,'2 the plaintiff attempted
to confine Liepelt to FELA cases. But the Court, with Justices Blackmun,
Brennan and Marshall expressing doubt, held that Liepelt "articulated
a federal common law rule.""'
144. For an economist's interpretation of what is involved in Pfeifer and Culver II,
see Wilbratte, Inflation and Damages in the Fifth Circuit, 147 Tex. B. J. 638 (1984).
145. O'Byrne v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry., 632 F.2d 1285, 1286 (5th Cir. 1980).
See also supra note 131.
146. Discount allowed: 22 Am. Jur. 2d, Damages § 108 (1965); Gretchen v. United
States, 618 F.2d 177 (2d Cir. 1980). Discount not allowed: St. Louis Southwestern Ry.,
632 F.2d at 1286.
147. 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (1983).
148. Rev. Bull. 54-19, 1954-Cumin. Bull. 179.
149. Annot., 62-66 A.L.R.2d Supp. 336; Flanigan v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 632
F.2d 880, 885 n.7 (8th Cir. 1980).
150. 444 U.S. 490, 100 S. Ct. 755 (1980).
151. Paquette v. Atlanska-Plovidba, 701 F.2d 746, 748 (8th Cir. 1983).
152. '453 U.S. 473, 101 S. Ct. 2870.
153. Id. at 486, 489, 101 S. Ct. at 2880, 2881.
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In Pfeifer'5 4 the Court extended Liepelt's federal common law pron-
ouncement in reducing lost wages to present value, holding that lost
wages would have been diminished by income taxes, and since the damage
award is tax free, the wage loss is "after tax wages and benefits."
The Liepelt rule has been applied in maritime personal injury cases
involving negligence,"' the LHWCA, 5 6 unseaworthiness, the Jones Act,' 57
negligence under the Death on the High Seas Act, and a state survival
statute. '"
In post-Liepelt bench trials, district courts have held that damage
awards for past and future lost income, both in maritime personal injury
cases and death cases, must exclude federal income taxes, so as to award
lost income net of taxes.'19
In one case, the court held that as damages for pain and suffering
are not subject to federal income taxes, no tax deduction should be
made for that item of damages. 60 In another' 6' the court interpreted
Liepelt to require the deduction of federal, state and local income tax,
and the court further deducted "personal maintenance" over life ex-
pectancy consistant with the decedent's age and life style.
The Second Circuit in Fanetti v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd. ,62 stated that
a defendant confronted with a claim for future lost wages is entitled
to have an after tax charge based on Liepelt when there is a stipulation
or evidence of future or past taxes, in which the jury should be instructed
that it may assume a future tax amount or tax percentage of wages
comparable to past tax years.
PRE-JUDGMENT INTEREST
63
The awarding of all interest in admiralty cases has traditionally been
considered a matter for the courts' discretion.' 64 At least in the Fifth
Circuit, pre-judgment interest, although discretionary, is usually auto-
154. 103 S. Ct. at 2555.
155. See Paquette, 701 F.2d 746 (8th Cir. 1983).
156. Fanetti v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 678 F.2d 424 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103
S. Ct. 3535 (1983); Rother v. Interstate & Ocean Transport Co., 540 F. Supp. 477, 482
(E.D. Pa. 1982); Roselli, 524 F. Supp. 2 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
157. See Brown v. Penrod Drilling Co., 534 F. Supp. 696 (W.D. La. 1982).
158. Kuntz, 573 F. Supp. 1277 (W.D. Pa. 1983).
159. See Roselli, 524 F. Supp. 2 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Rother, 540 F. Supp. 477 (E.D.
Pa. 1982); Penrod, 534 F. Supp. 696 (W.D. La. 1982).
160. Roselli, 524 F. Supp. 2 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
161. Kuntz, 573 F. Supp. 1277 (W.D. Pa. 1983).
162., Fanetti, 678 F.2d 424 (2d Cir. 1982).
163. See generally Annot., 34 A.L.R. Fed. 126 (1977).
164. The Umbria, 166 U.S. 404, 17 S. Ct. 610 (1897).
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matic in suits in admiralty.' 65 Federal statutory law covering interest
paid on judgments makes no provision for pre-judgment interest.'" Thus,
in accordance with the customary practice of admiralty courts, the trial
judge not only uses his discretion as to pre-judgment interest but also
fixes the rate.' 6' There seems to be no uniformity in the rate fixed.'"6
In cases tried on the admiralty side (no jury), whether personal
injury 69 or wrongful death actions under the general maritime law,
(Moragne)"° pre-judgment interest (usually from the date of the accident
or death to the date of judgment) has been awarded in the discretion
of the court."' This discretionary rule applies to Jones Act cases in
admiralty,"72 but in a Jones Act case tried at law in the Fifth Circuit,
no pre-judgment interest is allowed."13
In an OCSLA case no pre-judgment interest was allowed in a
judgment for a non-seaman based upon the LHWCA."14 Federal statutory
law" rather than state law governs interest paid on a personal injury
award for injuries suffered on a fixed platform on the outer continental
shelf. 176
The discretionary rule has been applied to Death on the High Seas
Act cases.
77
In admiralty, the allowance of pre-judgment interest as against pri-
vate persons, discussed above, and the allowance of such interest against
the United States are distinct.
165. Masters v. Transworld Drilling Co., 688 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1982).
166. Jarvis v. Johnson, 668 F.2d 740, 741 n.1 (3d Cir. 1982) (saying that legislation
for pre-judgment interest was proposed in 1981).
167. Gator Marine Service Towing, Inc. v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 651 F.2d 1096
(5th Cir. 1981); Independent Bull Transport, Inc. v. Vessel "Morania Abaco", 676 F.2d
23 (2d Cir. 1982).
168. Annot., supra note 163, § 9(a).
169. Harrison v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, S.A., 577 F.2d 968, 988 (5th Cir.
1978).
170. In re Metcalf, 530 F. Supp. 446, 461 (S.D. Tex. 1981); First National Bank of
Chicago v. Material Service Corp., 597 F.2d 1110, 1121 (7th Cir. 1979); Dennis v. Central
Gulf S.S. Corp., 453 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972).
171. Annot., supra note 163, §§ 16, 17.
172. Doucet v. Wheless Drilling Co., 467 F.2d 336 (5th Cir. 1972); Gardner v. National
Bulk Carriers, Inc., 333 F.2d 676, 677 (4th Cir. 1964); First National Bank, 597 F.2d at
1118-21 (dicta).
173. Doucet, 467 F.2d at 340.
174. Musial, 696 F.2d at 1154.
175. See infra note 185.
176. Berry v. Sladco, Inc., 495 F.2d 523, 528 (5th Cir. 1974); Aymond v. Texaco,
Inc., 554 F.2d 206, 212 (5th Cir. 1977); Ellis v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 650 F.2d 94, 98
(5th Cir. 1981).
177. Annot., supra note 115, § 12.
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Pre-judgment interest is banned by statute in cases against the United
States brought solely under the Public Vessels Act, absent a contract
expressly stipulating for the payment of interest. 7 1
The Suits in Admiralty Act provides that a decree for a money
judgment against the United States bears interest at the rate of four
percent, or at any higher rate stipulated by contract,'7 9 "interest to run
as ordered by the court." It has been held that in suits brought solely
under this Act, pre-judgment interest is allowable in the discretion of
the court. 80
On the other hand, if jurisdiction is predicated on both Acts, pre-
judgment interest has been held not to be recoverable.' 8'
There has been considerable judicial confusion in construing the
interest provisions of both Acts, 82 but the decision of the Supreme
Court in United States v. United Continental Tuna Corp.'83 may resolve
the matter. There the Court held that suits previously cognizable under
the Public Vessels Act, brought under the Suits in Admiralty Act (as
amended in 1960) are free of the former's restrictive clause relating to
pre-judgment interest. 84
POST-JUDGMENT INTEREST
Post-judgment interest on money judgments is statutory and is cal-
culated from the date of entry of the judgment in the district court.'85
It is based on the yield of 52-week U.S. Treasury bills. The statute ap-
plies to judgments rendered in admiralty.'86
ANNEX
SOME SUCCINCT CONCLUSIONS ABOUT CULVER II METHODOLOGY
I.
"Calculation of damages suffered by a person whose personal in-
juries will result in extended future disability or by the representatives
178. 46 U.S.C. § 782 (1983); Gretchen, 618 F.2d at 178; In re Sincere Navigation
Corp., 447 F. Supp. 672, 675 (E.D. La. 1978). See Annot., supra note 163, § 23.
179. 45 U.S.C. § 743 (1983).
180. Richmond Marine Panama, S.A. v. United States, 350 F. Supp. 1210, 1221
(S.D.N.Y. 1972).
181. Curry v. United States, 338 F. Supp. 1219 (N.D. Cal. 1971); Firth v. United
States, 554 F.2d 990, 995, 996 n.10 (9th Cir. 1977).
182. Annot., supra note 163, at 255.
183. 425 U.S. 164, 96 S. Ct. 1319 (1976).
184. Id.
185. 28 U.S.C. § 1961 (1983); Fed. R. App. P., R. 37.
186. Kotsopoulos v. Asturia Shipping Co., 467 F.2d 91, 94 (2d Cir. 1972); Gele v.
Wilson, 616 F.2d 146, 148 (5th Cir. 1980).
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of a deceased person" involves the following steps to determine "an ap-
propriate below market discount interest rate:" 87
A. Estimating the loss of work life resulting from injury or
death.1
8
B. Calculating the "lost income stream" over the work lifetime:
(1) Determining gross earnings (annual wages) of the in-
jured party at the time of injury LESS state and federal
income tax and unreimbursed costs, e.g. transportation
to work and uniforms,8 9 PLUS fringe benefits, such
as insurance coverage, pension and retirement plans,
and profit sharing and in-kind services. The Supreme
Court says such fringe benefits are frequently excluded
for simplicity.190
(2) Personal and Societal Factors are ADDED if proved.
Examples are personal merit and increased experience.' 9'
Pfeifer lists many others. 92
(3) General price inflation is ignored as a factor in deter-
mining the wage increases the worker would have re-
ceived each year. 93
C. The RESULT should be an estimate of what the lost income
stream would have been "as a series of after tax payments, one
in each year of the worker's expected remaining career."' 9"
D. Estimated average market interest rate, i.e., the rate of
return from the best and safest short or long term investments
during the worker's work expectancy, "computed after consid-
ering the effect of income tax on the interest received."' 95
E. This market interest rate is then offset by the estimated
rate of general future price inflation. This is the discount rate
which is applied to the lost stream of earnings. The end result
is hopefully "present value."
187. Culver, 722 F.2d at 117.
188. The same principles apply if the suit involves loss of earnings by a decedent, see
Culver, 722 F.2d at 117 n.2.
189. In wrongful death cases, the living expenses the worker would have incurred had
he continued to work and live are also substracted, see Culver, 722 F.2d at 117 n.3.
190. Pfeifer, 103 S. Ct. at 2549.
191. Culver, 722 F.2d at 122.
192. Pfeifer, 103 S. Ct. at 2549, 2550.
193. Culver, 722 F.2d at 118.
194. Id. at 117.
195. Id. at 117-18, 122.
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II.
The above methodology is the ONLY discount method to be followed
in the Fifth Circuit when the parties cannot agree. 
96
III.
Only evidence as to the "below market interest" rate is admissible. 97
IV.
The jury should be instructed as to the weight to be given expert
opinion evidence. It may then be permitted to return a single-figure
award for damages OR it may answer interrogatories stating inter alia,
the loss of future earnings for each year it makes its award, and the
discount rate it chooses to apply.)98
196. Id. at 122.
197. Id.
198. Id.
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